IDEAS Centre belongs to a special group of NGO actors because it provides consulting work on a political level from Geneva, unlike the majority of private law firms, which generally do consulting work on a legal basis and offer their services at a very high price.

In fact, the IDEAS Centre provides its services for developing countries, but it is also financed differently to other NGOs or private consultant firms. NGOs generally receive money from members and from governments through development aid for their programs and for the internal functioning of organization itself. This funding requires NGOs to prove to their members and their donors that they are performing as they should. IDEAS centre, in contrast, only receives its money for programs and projects but not for the running of the organization itself. In the specific case of the cotton negotiations, IDEAS Centre receives their funding from several European countries (D, F, GB, DK, S, CH) after having convinced them of the utility of the project.

For example, as one of the funding sources of IDEAS, Switzerland has to balance its short-term economic interest with its long-term development aid interests. As evidence, it is not always easy to bring these different targets together. Switzerland, as a small and open country, needs multilateral negotiations to have good market access conditions for its products. On the other hand, Switzerland has one of the highest degrees of national protectionism in the area of agriculture products. Of course, there are several countries like the United States that have a large cotton agriculture, which didn’t like in Cancun that IDEAS is in favour for the West African cotton producer countries. Therefore, the US thought that Switzerland, which is funding some parts of the IDEAS cotton project, wants fairer economic rules in a part of the agriculture sector where Switzerland produces nothing. As a result, the US has exerted political pressure on Switzerland, not knowing that IDEAS Centre is acting independently of the Swiss government. As a consequence, Switzerland was no longer able and willing to finance the cotton mandate, unless other funding sources could be found so as to avoid any accusations and to make sure that it is visible that IDEAS Centre is acting independently of the Government. Switzerland funded this project for development aid reasons because it allowed for an efficient way to improve the economic condition of the West African countries. Furthermore, it should be noted that IDEAS Centre was ostensibly acting without influence of the Swiss government.

As a result, IDEAS Centre can also focus on different objectives than most other NGOs. As mentioned above, one must distinguish between NGOs which lobby (and are a kind of opposition) and the NGO such as IDEAS Centre which work within the system. Or to use the model of this project: knowledge broker and public opinion shaper.

Generally, NGOs have a special interest in defending and representing their constituencies through an extreme position but also through technical arguments if they want to be heard. IDEAS Centre, on the other hand, is an NGO which tries to give negotiation tools to the developing countries - as is the case for the Cotton producer countries of Africa - so that they can better negotiate their positions. Therefore, IDEAS Centre begins to work where the other NGOs finish – in the actual negotiation process. Their proximity and access allows them to directly influence the negotiation process. It is also not the case that IDEAS Centre wants to create a new system of trade negotiations, as do many of their NGO counterparts, but instead to make the best of the existing system and help it to function well. This means, as a result, providing the needed negotiation skills to developing countries in order for them to work from within the multilateral system, and embrace the WTO. (See “fiche” of interview of IDEAS Centre)

IDEAS Centre helps African countries and Less Developed Countries (LDCs) in general to demand and attain the same rights as developed countries. An institution like the WTO, celebrating the idea of free trade with 149 members, should not be applying rules which do not consider the changing global context of trade and its subsequently changing role as an institution with a large diversity (because the members are more diverse) acquired over the last 10 years. Therefore, IDEAS Centre has decided to suggest to African countries to use the negotiation process, instead of going to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) as Brazil has done (see for details of the dispute between the US and Brazil of cotton: www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds267_e.htm).

First, IDEAS centre believes that LDCs are strongly dependent on the developed countries which are members of the WTO. This creates a power disadvantage and thus, a difficult situation for the accusing country or countries. Second, very few would change their behaviour to accommodate an LDC demand, as the rules are guaranteed to remain the same. And third, taking the case of Brazil: when Brazil won the dispute settlement process, they also won (erga omnes principle ¹). Negotiation, on the other hand, allows LDCs to say that they are not against a specific country, but that they want for the WTO to serve its intended role: a global institution which helps all countries trade fairly in a free market. Furthermore, LDCs also have strong political arguments, which can only be used through negotiations: they are some of the poorest countries in the world and without fair trade there is no development of their societies.

The impact of the organization comes from the fact that their partners, such as African countries in this case related to cotton, have confidence in the IDEAS Centre. They have achieved this trust because the organization has proven that they are serious, honest/frank and really want to help these countries make the most of the WTO system to their benefit and that they are really interested in the problems of these countries. Furthermore, IDEAS Centre has experience on the side of governments and on the side of opposing parties, which allows them to determine what is missing in arguments, and what must be improved.

Although IDEAS Centre decided that it does not directly negotiate inside of the African delegations in the negotiations of the WTO, it gives solutions to the African counties and tries to explain to the developed countries the African positions. Also, it is in a certain way a mediator between the Western and the African countries, since they are objective and realistic about what can be negotiated. One could say that IDEAS Centre has a double function by telling the Western countries the position of the African Countries, and vice versa; all the while strategically positioning themselves to be a part of the African delegation which needs their help. For this reason, IDEAS Centre has to be very careful not to abuse the confidence of each party.

The advantage of IDEAS Centre, to conclude, is that it knows how the other negotiating parties think. This is crucial for successful negotiations because WTO negotiations have special rules which can not necessarily be learned from people or organizations coming from the outside because they have their own language, habits and unwritten rules. They have access to the WTO and the relevant experience in negotiations to allow them to speak the right language, to know what is realistic and what just cannot be done. This is why their partnership with LDCs and in particular the cotton producing countries and affiliated NGOs has been so important.

IDEAS Centre provides policy instruments and knowledge to West African countries so they can stabilize their economy and succeed in the international negotiations on political issues of concern. Furthermore, IDEAS Centre seeks to provide understanding, knowledge and skills for them to be better integrated into the WTO and to strengthen their economy which is strongly dependent on agriculture.

Moreover, “the multilateral way” as it is celebrated by the WTO is essential for small and poor countries like the West African cotton producer countries which alone do not have the market size or the political weight to tackle bigger, developed countries and their coalitions. However, it is important to distinguish (inside of the government) between the interests of commerce and the interests of development aid. NGOs and governments alike, especially after the cotton Initiative, must ask themselves to what extent WTO negotiations can accomplish what countries expect it to accomplish. The latter, interest of development aid, are designed to achieve longer-term objectives, whereas the former, the interests of current “free trade” regimes, are merely responding to short-term realities which require a certain level of existing competitiveness, and are rarely truly fair.

The power of the WTO (still), nevertheless, remains with its members. Therefore, NGOs must try to directly influence member states (cf. IDEAS Centre with its negotiation suggestion and skills for the African countries). As evidence, NGOs would do well to try, like IDEAS Centre, to help LDCs become partners on the positions of a specific nation, and in this way give their input and exert influence for a more positive outcome.

See also “fiche” of interview of IDEAS Centre and www.ideascentre.ch

 

References

Personal Interview with M. Imboden (Executive Director) of IDEAS Centre, written responses received on 2nd January 2006 and oral interview on 24 January 2006.

BAFFES John: “The Cotton Problem”, p.109-144, In: Research Observer: Volume 20, Number 1, Spring 2005.

FAUPIN Alain, Général: “La pensée au service de l’action: les think tanks américains”, p.97-105, In: La revue internationale et stratégique, no. 52, Hiver 2003-2004.

FISHER R., URY W.: Getting to Yes. Negotiating Agreement without Giving In, Boston, 1981.

KAISER Robert and GSTÖHL Sieglinde: “Vernetztes Regieren in der globalen Handelspolitik: Zur Rolle internationaler Standards in der Welthandelsorganisation”, p.179-202, In: Zeitschrift für Internationale Beziehungen, No. 2, December 2004.

RAGARU Nadège and CONESA Pierre: “Les stratégies d’influence en affaires étrangères: notion insaisissable ou absence de volonté?”, p.83-88, In: La revue internationale et stratégique, no. 52, Hiver 2003-2004.

THURNER Paul W., KRONEBERG Clemens, STOIBER Michael: Strategisches Signalisieren bei internationalen Verhandlungen. Eine empirisch-quantitative Analyse am Beispiel der Regierungskonferenz 1996, IINS Research Paper No.16, Mannheim, 2003.

Aussenpolitischer Bericht 2000, [00.091].; Präsenz und Kooperation: Interessenwahrnehmung in einer zusammenwachsenden Welt, Bern, 2000.

Notes :

¹ Erga Omnes is a legal obligation toward all. The term falls within the International Law Principle of Universality, that is the idea that certain activities are so reprehensible that the rules of jurisdiction are waived so that any state may apprehend an alleged perpetrator and try them under their own jurisdiction.