Democratization has been part of United States (U.S.) foreign policy since the 1920s (2), a policy other countries also have implied and which both the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) now include in their aid programs. Such policies include the promotion of a democratic system by for instance, like in the U.S., providing aid for holding elections; creating state institutions, and; civil society, this way building democracy both from the top-down as well as from the bottom-up (3).

In the United States, the process has gone through different stages, or ‘waves’ as Carothers labels them, varying from efforts to battle communism during the 1960s in Latin America, to spreading to Asia by the end of the cold war with the fall of the Berlin wall when there was a ‘worldwide democratic revolution’ and aiding democracy abroad suddenly ‘was of intense interest to U.S. policy makers (4)’.

Democratization in these cases, is promoted either from one country (i.e. U.S.), one regional organization (i.e. EU), or, an international organization (UN), always with the receiver of this aid being a country. Lately, calls for democratization have however started to be heard at another level, namely within global governance.

In this paper, I wish to take these demands for democratization of global governance and compare them to the characteristics included in the process of democratization; to the different discussions on democratization vs. liberalization, and; to the discussion by Linz and Stepan’s on ‘stateness’ as a prerequisite to being ‘a democracy’.

Different demands for more democratic global governance

For the purposes of my discussion, I choose to refer to global governance as the efforts made by governments as well as non-governmental actors both multi-laterally as well as through international organizations, such as the UN and the Bretton Woods Institutions, to make decisions on interdependent interests (5). These interdependent interests range from environmental issues, such as global warming; health concerns, such as the spread of HIV/AIDS; to laws on migration and trade, regulating the degree of openness a country chooses for its borders.

Due to an increasingly globalized world, more and more decisions are being made at a global level, through for instance the UN and the Bretton Woods Institutions, in what people, ultimately affected by the decisions, perceive to be fairly undemocratic ways. In response to this increase of global decision-making, there has been an increase in demand for more participation, accountability and transparency, characteristics also looked for in democratic governance at the state level.

In a democratic system, the people, demos, are part of the decision-making process that shapes their common future. Citizens want to be given the possibility to participate in the decision-making processes on policies affecting them (6). On a global level, calls are equally being heard for more participation of the voiceless, noted in the demands for inclusion of both the less developed countries in the international organizations, such as the expansion of the Security Council discussed in the High Level Panel Report, as well as for the inclusion of civil society through broader participation as accredited non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the UN’s Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

To further increase participation, Michael Doyle, suggests a more democratic representation at the General Assembly (GA) where people would elect two out of the five delegates to represent their country in the GA, having candidates justify why they should be elected. A second suggestion from Doyle includes providing a pre-GA consultative session for civil society, where accredited NGOs would discuss the topics of the GA agenda (7).

Calls are strong and efficient for increased participation by civil society. A risk with this enhanced role however, is that these groups themselves are receiving criticism for not being democratic, claiming to represent the voiceless while never having been directly elected by those they claim to be representing.

One more direct call for democratization of global governance comes from Richard Falk who suggests the creation of a global parliament, drawing upon the experiences from the European Union’s creation of a European Parliament (8).

In a democracy, elected representatives are expected to be accountable to their voters and transparent in their work. At a global level, already existing organizations and actors involved in global governance are equally requested to be more accountable and transparent. Kristin Dawkins (9) discusses this while also suggesting that these organizations seek more input from regional organizations that can provide them with essential information from the different regions through their more direct connections with these areas.

Are these calls demands for democratization of global governance or are we here mainly looking for liberalization?

Democratization vs. liberalization:

According to Linz and Stepan, liberalization includes political and social changes in a system. Such changes include less censorship of the media, ‘…greater space for organization of autonomous working-class activities…’ as well as more tolerance of the opposition.

Democratization on the other hand, includes more than liberalization since it ‘…entails open contestation over the right to win control of the government…’ something which is achieved through competitive elections (10).

Democratization also includes the establishment and further development of democratic institutions that are transparent and accountable to the electorate (11). The aim is to nourish attitudes and behaviour in support of a democratic system as part of the day-to-day lives of people within a society. Democratic consolidation is achieved when people believe there is no other game in town, seeing the democratic system as the ‘…most appropriate way to govern collective life… (12)’, with people actively participating and not being attempted to turn to any non-democratic alternatives.

Placing the calls for democratization of global governance in this limelight, we can see that the demands indeed include more than only a liberalized system, particularly with such calls as transparency, accountability and participation. Holding free and fair elections are also called for, in the examples discussed above, provided by Michael Doyle and Richard Falk.

Having established that we are talking about democratization of global governance, it still seems necessary to look into yet another distinction: that between the establishment of a democratic polity and of democratization of an existing system. Here, Linz and Stepan’s discussion on stateness becomes relevant.

Stateness and democracy

Stepan and Linz emphasize the need to have a state in place in order for a democratic policy to emerge. ‘Democracy is a form of governance of a state. Thus, no modern polity can become democratically consolidated unless it is first a state (13).’ A sovereign state is therefore a prerequisite to democracy. ‘..democracy is a form of governance of a modern state. Thus without a state, no modern democracy is possible (14)’.

In their discussion, Linz and Stepan use Weber and Tilly to describe what they mean with ‘state’. Weber calls a state a ‘…compulsory association with a territorial basis…’, whereas Tilly points out that a state needs to be ‘…differentiated from other organizations operating in the same territory…’; be autonomous and; have its divisions ‘…formally coordinated with one another’.

In order for there to be democracy, there needs to be a state with an established base for citizenship. In order for this to happen, there needs to be a national internal sense of identification, a definition of demos (15).

These attributes need to be in place, Linz and Stepan say, and five additional arenas fulfilled in order for there to be democratic governance (16):

1. Conditions for the ‘development of a free and lively civil society’;

2. An ‘autonomous and valued political society’;

3. The rule of law, ‘embedded in a spirit of constitutionalism’ in order to ensure the ‘legal guarantees for citizens’ freedoms and independent associational life’;

4. An established state bureaucracy through which the government effectively can exercise ‘its claim to the monopoly of the legitimate use of force in the territory,’ collecting taxes from the citizens that will be used to pay for police, judges and basic services, and;

5. An ‘institutionalized economic society’, with a regulated market economy, providing for public goods and correcting market failures (17).

Global governance and the idea of ‘stateness’ as a prerequisite to democracy

Just as Wedeen challenges Linz and Stepan’s idea that a democracy can not be established prior to the existence of a state, when she describes how the notion of citizenship in Yemen actually was established partially due to a fragile state with tenuous national identification (18), I here wish to question the relevance of their argument in the discussion around democratization of global governance.

It seems obvious that the initial reaction is that the idea of ‘stateness’ would not be relevant at all in the discussions on democratization of global governance. What however is true is that the main actors interacting at a global level indeed are sovereign member-states (despite the increasing inclusion of non-state actors such as businesses and civil society). Based on this initial conclusion, the question however follows, is global governance not able to be democratic?

Looking at the five additional areas that, according to Linz and Stepan, need to be fulfilled in order for there to be democratic governance, we however find more interesting parallels:

1. Civil society: One of the main emphases in global governance, particularly in attempting to make global governance more democratic, involves the inclusion of civil society in the decision-making processes. There has also been proof of increased inclusion of civil society as discussed above (see discussion on NGOs and the UN). One could therefore argue that global governance does include civil society, and an increasingly vivid civil society.

2. Autonomous and valued political society: Following Linz and Stepan’s idea of political society being the ‘…arena in which the polity specifically arranges itself to contest the legitimate right to exercise control over public power and the state apparatus (19), global governance does provide room for political discussions, despite the fact that such discussions tend to be dominated by more powerful states. The ‘arena’ is however in place.

3. Rule of law: With multi-lateral treaties and the International Criminal Court, there is most definitely a basis for the rule of law within global governance. More and more decisions are made, backed up by laws signed by the member-states, that decide on how to address specific interdependent issues.

4. State bureaucracy: Criticism of the UN includes that of inefficiency, both due to the weakness of its executive body as well as the existence of too much red tape. In this sense, one would say that global governance indeed has a well established bureaucracy. With regard to the taxing system that exists in democratic states, this could be reflected in the idea of introducing the so called Tobin tax, named after Nobel-Laureate James Tobin, suggesting the collection of revenues to cover global priorities (20). What however is still not in place at a global level, but suggested on a state-level, is the monopoly of the legitimate use of force. The discussions within the UN to create a standing army that would be able to be deployed rapidly however suggest that thoughts are heading toward this direction.

5. Economic society: The role of the IMF and World Bank as regulators of the world economy is well established. The bodies’ increased role is in fact one of the main reasons for demands of democratization of global governance, suggested for instance through the inclusion of less-developed states in the decision-making processes. Although there are strong attempts to correct global and even national market failures, one would however need to research further into the provision of common goods provided by these institutions.

Concluding from this comparison, we could therefore say that global governance does have a basis for becoming more democratic. Following their argument of statehood however, it seems that global governance can not become ‘a democracy’. In this sense, maybe democratization of global governance more resembles the case of Hongkong, where there, according to Linz and Stepan, indeed can be ‘…important democratic developments, form of power sharing and significant consultation… (21)’. Democratizing global governance would be possible, but unless global governance moves towards becoming global government, it will not become ‘a democracy’.

Forth wave of democratization?

With global governance not foreseen as becoming a democracy, it is still interesting to acknowledge the wave of democratization that has begun of global governance. Demands are strong for a more democratic decision-making process at a global level, claims of inclusion are made both from countries that themselves may not be consolidated democracies, as well as from civil society organizations across the world that themselves may claim to speak on behalf of people whom have not elected them. Still, what is interesting is that these claims are expressed openly in an atmosphere of joint cooperation, where the freedom to present these demands is generally accepted and taken into consideration.

Using Samuel P. Huntington’s characterization of waves of democratization, (first one stretching between 1828-1926; second wave from 1943-1962, and; third wave starting in 1974 (22).), is it possible that we may be looking at a forth wave, this time stretching further, beyond the sovereign state? And if so, how will this affect the policies towards democratization? This question invites to further research, something I hope my attempt of creating a discussion on the topic of democratization of global governance will inspire to.

 

 

 

Bibliography

Blecker, Robert A, Taming Global Finance: A better architecture for growth and equity, Economic Policy Institute, USA, 1999

Carothers, Thomas Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C., USA, 1999.

Dawkins, Kristin, Global Governance: The Battle Over Planetary Power. New York: Open Media Book, Seven Stories Press, 2003.

Falk, Richard and Strauss, Andrew, “The Deeper Challenges of Global Terrorism:

A Democratizing Response” in Debating Cosmopolitics, ed. Daniele Archibugi, Verso, 2003.

Huntington, Samuel P., The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1991.

“Imagining Tomorrow, Rethinking the global challenge” Collected and compiles on the occasion of the United Nations Millennium Assembly, Merill Corporation, 2000.

Krahmann, Elke, “National, regional, and global governance: One phenomenon or many?” Global Governance. 2003 (9:3).

Linz, Juan and Stepan, Alfred, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1996.

USAID Occasional Paper Series Civil Society Groups And Political Parties: Supporting Constructive Relationships March 2004,

www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/pnacu631.pdf

Wedeen, Lisa, “Seeing Like a Citizen, Acting Like a State: Exemplary Events in Unified Yemen,” Comparative Studies in Society and History (October 2003): 608-713

Wollack, Kenneth, Statement by Kenneth Wollack, President of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Before the Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights, U.S. House of Representatives, See: www.accessdemocracy.org/library/1724_ww_testimony_070704.htm

Fichas :

1. This essay was submitted at the School of International and Public Affairs, Columbia University in New York for Instructor Lincoln Mitchell’s class "Challenges in Democratization and Governance" INAFU8789, Spring 2005.

2.Carothers, Thomas Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning Curve, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington D.C., USA, 1999, p.3

3. ibid pp.86-89

4. ibid p.40

5. See for instance Elke Krahmann’s discussions in “National, regional, and global governance: One phenomenon or many?” Global Governance. 2003 (9:3)

6. USAID Occasional Paper Series Civil Society Groups And Political Parties: Supporting Constructive Relationships March 2004, p. 16. See: www.usaid.gov/our_work/democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/pnacu631.pdf

7. “Imagining Tomorrow, Rethinking the global challenge” Collected and compiles on the occasion of the United Nations Millennium Assembly, Merill Corporation, 2000

8. Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss, “The Deeper Challenges of Global Terrorism: A Democratizing Response” in Debating Cosmopolitics, ed. Daniele Archibugi, Verso, 2003. Also supported by a talk given by Richard Falk at the Columbia Law School on April 12, 2005

9. Dawkins, Kristin, Global Governance: The Battle Over Planetary Power. New York: Open Media Book, Seven Stories Press, 2003.

10. Linz, Juan and Stepan, Alfred, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1996, p.3

11. Statement by Kenneth Wollack, President of the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, Before the Committee on International Relations Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights, U.S. House of Representatives, See: www.accessdemocracy.org/library/1724_ww_testimony_070704.htm

12. Linz, Juan and Stepan, Alfred, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1996, p.6

13. Ibid., p.7

14. Ibid. p.17

15. Linz, Juan and Stepan, Alfred, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1996, pp.22-28

16. Ibid. pp. 17-18

17. Linz, Juan and Stepan, Alfred, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1996, pp.7-12

18. See Wedeen, Lisa, “Seeing Like a Citizen, Acting Like a State: Exemplary Events in Unified Yemen,” Comparative Studies in Society and History (October 2003): 608-713, p.707

19. Linz, Juan and Stepan, Alfred, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1996, p.8

20. See Blecker, Robert A, Taming Global Finance: A better architecture for growth and equity, Economic Policy Institute, USA, 1999

21. Linz, Juan and Stepan, Alfred, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore and London, 1996, p.19

22. Huntington, Samuel P., The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman, 1991, p.16