Part 1: Case study: Cotton

The recent apparition of cotton subsidies as a single issue in international trade negotiations helps to explain the rising influence of certain coalitions of non-governmental and governmental actors in realising their common goals. From the initial call of producer organisations from Burkina Faso, Benin, Mali and Madagascar for the US and the EU to end their cotton subsidies (which eventually became the “Cotton 4” – Burkina Faso, Benin, Mali and Chad), a separate part of the WTO ministerial text was subsequently dedicated to the cotton issue in agricultural negotiations, thus solidifying the impact of NGOs in the traditionally State-centric realm of trade negotiations.

The case of cotton is unique as it became one of the most decisive factors in the Hong Kong trade negotiations for southern States: its success or failure in negotiations symbolized their capacity (or incapacity) to enforce rules and actions in the WTO. In addition, as opposed to Brazil who chose to legally challenge the United States (the country with the largest amount of cotton subsidies), the Cotton 4 chose to negotiate, furthering the idea that their case was a symbol of the ability of southern countries to have an impact on negotiations. For the actual cotton producers from the South, however, the case was obviously more substantial than symbolic.

 

The first part of this note will be an overview of the non-governmental actors and their positions, specifically on cotton. The second part will address the coalitions and competition between these NGO actors and their respective tactics in light of the stakes involved. The third part will concern the stakes and competition between States and their interactions with NGOs. In conclusion, the question of how NGOs impact the concept of “trade governance” will be addressed to demonstrate how these NGOs have a real impact not only in a State’s domestic policy space, but also how it interacts with other States on the international level.

Non-governmental actors

Four major NGOs were chosen who have an internationally visible influence on cotton negotiations: Oxfam International, ENDA tiers monde, ICTSD and IDEAS. In addition, three smaller NGO producer groups had a signifigant impact on the Sectoral Intitiative for cotton: ROPPA (Réseau des Organisations Paysans et Producteurs de l’Afrique), Aproca (Association des Producteurs de l’Afrique), ACA (African Cotton Association) and their networks of smaller producer groups. (Although there are other NGOs, for the simplicity we have limited our analysis to these four. This does not mean, however, that the other NGOs involved in the cotton issue have not also played a pivotal role).

These NGOS can be characterized as belonging to two groups: “knowledge brokers” and “public opinion shapers”. The first group includes research organizations disseminating information. A knowledge broker is an organization or actor who works with other NGOs and States to influence State positions in negotiations through resource sharing, technical knowledge and expertise in a specific subject area. A public opinion shaper is an organization or actor who uses information campaigns, strategic positioning, media communications and indirect or direct lobbying to attempt to sway public opinion and State opinions in a specific subject area. Within the second group there are those with a direct constituent base outside of their membership, entitled: “speaking for others”, and those with a membership base usually from within their country of origin, entitled: “speaking for themselves”. These two groups are not mutually exclusive, specifically at the international level, where large NGOs use a variety of tactics in order to achieve their goals.

• Oxfam is an international NGO, well financed and composed of 12 national NGOs; it is a knowledge broker and public opinion shaper, falling into the first category: “speaks for others”. Oxfam has a two pronged approach to their global “Make Trade Fair” campaign. The first part is composed of efforts to educate the public in rich countries to lobby their governments’ in order to change trade policy (public opinion shaper). Additionally, their vast resources (research and otherwise) aid poor countries who can not afford to research and lobby their own positions by taking these positions to a more global level (in this way they are “speaking for others”). The second part of the initiative is a technical information campaign involving detailed reports which provide the background for policy decisions that can be adopted by governments (knowledge broker). Their specific mechanisms on the cotton issue include large PR campaigns as part of Make Trade Fair, the co-organisation of Cotton Day (a seminar held one day before the negotiations started in Hong Kong for the Ministerial Conference) and detailed reports on the impact of US subsidies on African cotton producers. These reports and research helped provide the background for their campaigns and add legitimacy to their programs. < 1>

→Oxfam’s strategy: As one Oxfam representative stated, “each NGO has a specific role to play, there is a division of labour and tasks that occurs.” In the coalition that formed between Oxfam, ENDA and APROCA, aided by ICTSD, there were different strategies at work. Oxfam, as a knowledge broker, used its research resources and media connections to broadcast its report and in doing so, pushed the cotton issue to the forefront of the trade agenda. The seminar Cotton Day was held by ICTSD but publicised by Oxfam in part of its Make Trade Fair agenda. The drawing power of the name of Oxfam brought a large audience to the conference, as the surprise visit of the US delegation to the event demonstrated the importance that the US, one of the largest trading powers in the world, gave to the event. The technical expertise of the economists at Oxfam gave a rigorously academic legitimacy to the West African country’s claims. At the Cotton Day seminar itself Oxfam’s speeches stood out as the most technical, again adding weight to the subject.

• ENDA Tiers Monde (a knowledge broker and public opinion shaper: “speaks for others”) is an NGO situated in Senegal, but formerly financed by France. As a national NGO that works extensively in West Africa, one subdivision, DIAPOL (prospectives dialogues politiques), works to disseminate information in order to aide poorer countries in the complex negotiations that occur in trade. As they state: “poverty does not include only an economic dimension…» : the production of information for both southern and northern populations about the impacts of global trade in West African countries (in this way they are public opinion shapers speaking for the southern producers) is a central part of their operations. Specifically on the cotton issue, in co-ordination with Oxfam, the African Cotton Association, the Association of African Cotton Producers and the International Centre for Trade and Development, ENDA tiers monde produced the White Book on Cotton, which details the stakes for Southern countries if US cotton subsidies continue (this research is one way in which they are knowledge brokers). The book was the basis for the Cotton Day seminar in Hong Kong. < 2>

→ ENDA tiers monde’s strategy: “The White Book on Cotton”, was an integral part of not only their own strategy but was a central part of the strategy of the West African countries in Hong Kong. The book was available on their website and in hard copy at the Cotton Day seminar, furthering the importance of their work and its impact on the negotiations. This book outlined the specifics of the damage of US cotton subsidies and was a platform for African ministers of trade to voice their opinions. It symbolised the work of ENDA as a knowledge broker from the South: its ability to provide technical information as well as the legitimacy of being close to the actual problem. Their advocacy on behalf of the African producers was demonstrated not only by their indirect influence in holding a seminar but also by publicising the cause and uniting diverse producer groups. In addition, ENDA tiers monde was a key financer in facilitating the stay of many trade ministers from West African countries. Their strategy supports the elimination of cotton subsidies in a strictly judicial sense in response to the judgement in the US/Brazil case in which US cotton subsidies were ruled illegal by the Dispute Settlement Body in 2001.<3>

The continuation of these subsidies, despite this ruling, is argued as the central reason that competitive African cotton can not compete on the market. In their words, they do not take an ideological stand but rather defend the sovereignty of countries to demand that trade rules be applied equally.<4>

• ICTSD (International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development) is a think tank based in Geneva, funded by the Swiss government and is a knowledge broker. Their mission statement is to “empower stakeholders in trade policy through information, networking, dialogue, well-targeted research, and capacity building to influence the international trade system such that it advances the goal of sustainable development.” They publish the influential magazine “Bridges” in Geneva and provide information on trade and development. Their partnerships include southern and northern NGOs and States. They diffuse information about development issues to all parties involved, both North and South, but they specifically aim at capacity building in poorer countries to enable them to interact/negotiate and achieve their goals. In the cotton dossier, for example, they informed the West African countries on their possible policy options- to negotiate or to go to the DSB.

→ ICTSD’s strategy: ICTSD, as a knowledge broker, had a behind the scenes role in the negotiations, whereby their influence was as much focused on pre-conference capacity building as it was on helping to build alliances during Hong Kong in providing NGOs and actors from developing countries with a variety of technical information. Their role in the cotton dossier started when they published studies on the West African cotton problem after doing research on development and trade in the region. In November 2002, due to a research article published by ICTSD on the cotton issue, the NGO invited African diplomats and ENDA, Oxfam and IDEAS centre to gather for a discussion on cotton and the decision on whether to go to the DSB or head to the negotiating table. The overall strategy from the decision to create the Sectoral Initiative on Cotton to Hong Kong, was to provide the West African countries with the expertise and information to make informed decisions as well as to push cotton to the forefront of agricultural negotiations.<5>

• IDEAS Centre is another knowledge broker funded by the Swiss government that seeks to reform the WTO system from within. In their own words, “We work within the system: we are funded by the system and thus our rules of the game are very different [than those of other NGOs]. We must be analytical and neutral. However, neutral doesn’t mean that we don’t defend certain clear opinions and interests, but we must translate them through the language of the system. We look for the most workable solutions and not those that are theoretical and absolutist. We must take into account divergent opinions.” IDEAS is a unique organisation in that it works “inside” the system but also as an outsider, working with diverse actors, effectively empowering them and participating in capacity building.<6> The centre provides advisory services and its resources to lower-income countries. Specifically on cotton, they organized their own Cotton Day seminar in Hong Kong which included delegates from the cotton producing countries as well as trade ministers from France, Germany and Denmark. Their project on cotton specifically involves “assisting West and Central African countries in utilising the WTO mechanisms and the Doha Round negotiations to defend their trade interests. This included the preparation of a submission titled: “Poverty Reduction: Sectoral Initiative in favour of Cotton” (TN/AG/GEN/4 of 16 May 2003),” as well as supporting a broad based initiative for defending the cotton initiative.<7>

→IDEAS Centre strategy: IDEAS concentrated on its own Cotton Day in which it invited the delegations from Germany and Denmark as well as other European countries and the delegates from the West African countries. Their strategy was to unite the member States with which they have contact (European) in a dialogue with the West African countries. Their Cotton Day was held inside the conference center as opposed to outside the conference center. This decision was perceived by certain NGOs as proof of a rift between the coalitions of ENDA/Oxfam et al., however, others saw it as a delegation of tasks: IDEAS centre, funded by the Swiss government, has more contacts with European delegates and naturally went to the conference center where both NGOs and delegates had equal space.

• ROPPA (Réseau des Organisations Paysans et Producteurs Africains) is a platform for organizations of farmers and agricultural producers in Africa (a public opinion shaper that “speaks for self”). They are a relatively recent organisation, founded in July 2000 at the Cotonou negotiations and categorized as a public opinion shaper which “speaks for itself”. The organization represents 10 West African countries and their work consists of small producer advocacy and the provision of training and information. They do not advocate the separation of cotton as a separate issue from other basic commodities such as soybeans or cocoa. ROPPA’s main advocacy position is the concept of “food security”: support for a country to enact subsidies for products which permit a country to feed its people. ROPPA advocates international price control mechanisms for all base products.

→ROPPA’s strategy: ROPPA, post its ideological split with ENDA, Oxfam and IDEAS, aligned itself with French NGOs such as Co-ordination SUD (Solidarity, Urgency, Development) and le GRET (Research and Technology Exchange Group) who lobby for food security and the right of producers to uphold subsidies in France (and Europe) as well as in West Africa. ROPPA’s advocacy efforts were centred on informing the public about their position and aligning themselves with countries that supported the continuation of subsidies to protect markets.<8>

• ACA (African Cotton Association) is an association that works with Aproca to support and promote the interests of African cotton producers (public opinion shaper “speaks for self”). The ACA was the product of the Conference of West African and Central African ministers of agriculture in Cotonou, Benin.

• APROCA (Association des Producteurs du Coton de l’Afrique) is a specific producer group that was formed in Benin by François Traoré of Burkina Faso, in order to represent the interests of 12 West African cotton producing countries (this is another group that is a public opinion shaper “speaks for self”). After the ideological split between ROPPA and the rest of the cotton NGOs, a part of the ROPPA membership became the core constituency of APROCA. Due to the fall in cotton prices, APROCA created an advocacy campaign in order to get the cotton issue on the international agenda. The strategy, set at the end of the conference on the Sectoral Initiative on Cotton, was to regroup the cotton producing organisations from the entire African continent, create a sense of solidarity between the members and most importantly to diffuse information to these organisations concerning cotton. < 9> Traroé’s speech at the WTO on free trade , is an example of how APROCA brought national issues to the international level. < 10>

→ The common strategy of both APROCA and ACA was to support the initiative from the “farmer” point of view – keeping in touch with the population, adding expertise from the field and giving legitimacy to the entire operation. These organisations or NGOs fall into the category “speaks for self” and thus are able to appropriately describe what occurs in the West African cotton industry. APROCA, most importantly, participated in the delegation of Benin in an advisory role.

 

Division and Competition between the NGOs

South-South

Before Hong Kong a divide existed between many local West African NGOs and other NGOs between the need to regulate prices at an international level and the need to end American subsidies.

The apparent ideological differences between certain organisations lead to a fracture between ROPPA and ENDA tiers-monde. Both organisations worked together until what the director of ENDA tiers monde stated, “ROPPA was starting to become too radical.” ROPPA advocated price regulation and the concept of food security whereas ENDA advocated national sovereignty to enforce trade rules for the benefit of southern cotton producing countries. This break between the two southern NGOs created APROCA, who was born out of the former members of ROPPA who disagreed with their policy.

APROCA had a clear interest in forming an alliance with ENDA tiers monde who took up their specific product as a cause. ENDA’s involvement in cotton was straight-forward: post the Doha Development round, northern countries, which had decided to open up agriculture to the debate on free trade, still had major agricultural subsidies. They were encouraged by the fact that Brazil had filed an appeal in 2002 to the Dispute Settlement Body against the United States claiming that their cotton subsidies violated free trade agreements. The fact that the US still had not complied with the ruling created fertile ground for a strong argument from the West African countries.

Thus, ENDA tiers monde took up the argument of US cotton subsidies for two main reasons: one, they were judged illegal (in the Brazil case) and yet still in practice, and two, their existence was decreasing international prices to such an extent that African cotton producing countries could no longer compete. This case, according to ENDA tiers monde, was a clear violation of WTO mandates and, as it directly impacted West African countries and their producers, it was an opportunity for the South to interact in the negotiations. Due to the fact that a northern country, promoting free trade in Africa (with increased market access/dismantling of protectionist barriers for infant industries etc.) was blocking reciprocal trade by subsidising their own farmers, made the case was quite clear for them. In addition to the substantive parts of the negotiations the symbolic power of a southern State participating in the negotiations was important. Additionally, many thought that this case could pave the way for more southern country participation.

ROPPA, on the other side of the debate strongly argued that there should not be a difference between a cotton farmer and a cocoa farmer nor a soybean farmer (it is interesting to note that these same products were mentioned by the US in their attempt to divert attention from cotton subsidies at the Cotton Day seminar). Their position, centered on food security, was unable to compromise on what they termed an inequality in putting one base product above another. They argued that to support the plight of the cotton farmer was to ignore the larger picture of the problem of a lack of international price controls. These supply-side price controls were argued to increase profits for the African farmers as the market would not have an influx of cheaper goods from subsidized farmers. ROPPA lobbied for this position at the WTO conference and against the liberalization of markets, their separate conference on Food security in Hong Kong highlighted this difference. The ideology of ROPPA is that fair trade can not exist in a world with largely inherent disparities between industrialised, rich countries and the poor. Thus, the idea of eliminating subsidies does not go far enough to alleviate these problems which are better managed through a larger market controlling mechanism. These view points differ in their approach to solving the problem- ENDA takes a more vertical approach in concentrating on one product as ROPPA takes a more horizontal approach concentrating on all products. To be precise, it was these tensions between conflicting approaches which caused the rupture, there was not a conflict. This tension was apparent during the press conference following the Cotton Day seminar; a comment was made by a ROPPA representative linked to food security. This "statement" (more than a question) brought defensive statements from the certain delegates who refused to reply to "such an attack."

North-South

ENDA tiers monde and IDEAS

In a similar way to the split between ENDA tiers monde and consequently the rest of the coalition (Oxfam, ICTSD et.al. ) with ROPPA, there was another ideological rift in the coalition between ENDA tiers monde and IDEAS. Once again, ENDA tiers monde takes what it describes as a more pragmatic route in supporting the elimination of cotton subsidies in Northern countries as part of a poverty reduction plan for West African cotton producing countries. According to ENDA, IDEAS’ role was much more ideologically motivated, as part of their liberal free trade agenda. On the contrary, Oxfam and ICTSD still worked with them and Oxfam saw IDEAS’ role as a facilitator for resources (for example in paying for plane tickets and other practical maters) and in their advisory role to southern countries.

STATES

Status Quo defenders

The straight forward competition in cotton negotiations occurred between the US and the members of the EU, the former targeted by NGOs. Despite the fact that the EU does not have subsidies on cotton, the US grouped cotton with agriculture and attacked the EU on their “un-ambitious plan” for agricultural market access. These divergences between the US and the EU were highly criticised by the West African cotton producing countries as they argued that the ongoing disputes between the EU and the US were taking the focus away from the “real debate” which was cotton subsidies and the competitiveness of African Cotton. At the Cotton day Seminar the attacks between the US and the EU, literally argued across the conference room were a physical representation of the so-called “ping pong” game between the two large players that “left the African countries out”, according to the West African delegates and ENDA. The cotton issue was a sore spot for the US due to the ruling in 2004 against its cotton subsidies in the case brought against it by Brazil. A team of US representatives distributed pamphlets detailing US actions on the cotton initiative and effectively “worked the room” at the seminar spreading the word at each table about what the US has done to alleviate poverty in West Africa. This reframing of the issue from US subsidies to poverty alleviation measures was a major part of the tactics in Hong Kong employed by the US to divert attention away from their inaction on the Brazil ruling.

The mandates set by the US under the tense political conditions are a reaction to the competitive nature of not only the negotiations, but the political impact of the negotiations. An inability to compromise on an issue as important as cotton could have had major political impacts, specifically due to the attention that NGOs focused on the subject. Media focus and pressure by NGOs caused the US to decide at the last minute to attend the Cotton Day seminar. The US was not originally on the list of attendees, but rather called and asked to be allowed to come in order to make an important statement about US policy on cotton subsidies. While the all important statement was lacking from the US discourse, their presence indicates that not all negotiating strategies are finalized before the Ministerial conferences and that reactions and interactions between States amongst themselves and between States and NGOS lead to new dynamics and sometimes unpredictable outcomes.

 

Additionally, between the West African countries there were divergences as to which position to take in 2002- to go to the DSB or to go to follow the negotiating route. These divergences were settled eventually due to the advice/steering of certain NGOs in the process of the negotiations in Abidjan. Southern countries are usually part of the group of paradigm shifters but in this case the West African countries are not advocating changing the paradigm but rather are supporting the neo-liberal trade regime. Their stance on cotton subsidies is coherent with a larger free trade perspective. The West African countries’ coalition is one of the strongest outcomes of the entire process. The specific issue of cotton led to an empowerment of these countries in regards to their abilities to bring forward a negotiating proposal. However, their increased visibility was due to the fact that they were “playing by the rules” (set forth by those who created the paradigm).

The difference between the two "status quo defenders " is that the US was defending the status quo as it is currently exercised by powerful countries in the WTO, or the real politik of trade negotiations, whereas the West African countries were defending the status quo as it could be if actually applied to the WTO rules of trade. However, the strategies were also divergent, as evidenced by an NGO meeting in Hong Kong. While the US stated and restated its diplomatic discourse on poverty alleviation and the question of competitiveness of West African cotton regardless of US subsidies, the West African strategy was strikingly less coherent. Separate issues were brought up that diminished the original argument that US cotton subsidies were creating a distortion in the market and that this reason alone would destroy African cotton producers’ livelihoods. One representative from the African Delegation started a speech stating that "the real problem is AIDS" which is causing massive poverty in Africa. Another delegate stated that African cotton was the most competitive in the world because of its exceptional quality due to hand picking and then continued to argue that it was impossible to compete against large cotton picking machines in the States. This blurring of arguments did not help the West African delegates and instead allowed the USTR to stick to their own arguments concerning the benefits of food aid and the fact that West African cotton is not competitive, i.e. subsidies are not the problem.

 

 

Paradigm shifters

Certain States from both the North and South, for example Brazil and Switzerland, can be considered paradigm shifters in that they use their State’s weight to shift arguments and influence longer-term outcomes. Brazil, in having won their case against the United States on cotton subsidies abandoned the usual route of southern protectionism. The rift between Brazil and the other G20 countries is a paradigm shift. Switzerland, in having funded NGOs that promote capacity building for lower income countries in trade negotiations, seeks to include a larger voice of civil society in actual negotiations. This is a shift from the usual European stance which seeks to fund those NGOs that support their own interests. The fact that they fund IDEAS and ICTSD demonstrates a commitment to certain organisations that could undermine and effectively shift the current paradigm of international trade relations in the status quo. Thus, paradoxically, there are some that gain from the system, yet support NGOs that seek to challenge or change the system.

Examining the Meta Variables: the impact of power relations in trade negotiations

In an analysis of actor relations certain overarching power differentials must be taken into account. The coalitions and strategies described above both impact and are formed by certain overarching Meta variables. The two discussed below are the structural power of large, rich trading countries to create a trade regime that favors their policies and the relative power of each NGO in relation to one another during the negotiations.

The structural power of larger, rich States is seen in their indirect (and sometimes direct) ability to set the rules of the entire “game” of international trade negotiations. For example: the fact that the WTO was founded on trade liberalisation is a concept that rich, highly powerful countries have determined is the best policy option for poorer countries. The US’ and EUs’ negligence to address agricultural subsidies in liberalisation talks before the Doha round is another example of their ability to choose what goes on the table and what stays out. The effects of this power are reflected in: the decision making process of deciding which countries are allowed to negotiate in the “Green Room”, the norms of “accepted discourse” at WTO negotiations, the specific legal standard (anglo-saxon common law), the preference for technical arguments and, most importantly, the overall policy agenda (this extends to both the paradigm shifters and the status quo defenders). However, this power can be eroded by initiatives started by NGOs. As seen in Cancùn, the advent of new issues “on the spot” can be incredibly destabilizing by even the most powerful trading nations such as the US. However, the extent of this erosion is unknown and should be analysed as to whether it can effectively surmount the structural constraints of the system or if it is only able to suggest changes that are then accepted or rejected by the strong, powerful trading States.

The effects of the relative power of well funded, “powerful” NGOs (defined as their ability to constrain or affect the actions of other actors) can be seen in their partnerships which do not always require consent or their objectives that may not be achieved in a democratic way. Such power can also be demonstrated by these actors “speaking for a community” which may exclude important social groups . The instances in Hong Kong where certain NGO seminars were well attended by both the public and by delegates and, in contrast, where smaller NGOs seminars were almost empty; demonstrate the relative inequalities amongst NGOs.

As discussed above, the inherent power disparities between northern and southern States and NGOs can play an important role in trade governance by increasing or decreasing the policy space of States. In the case of cotton the “structural power” and “relative power” of resourced actors, both States and NGOs becomes evident in the steps up to the Hong Kong negotiations, starting in 2001. The entire process from start to finish was inside the well defined “rules of the game” upheld not only by the NGOs, both the North and South, but also by Southern states through the help of these NGOs. The well funded States who create the accepted discourse in the WTO influenced the choice for an initiative to be brought before the WTO committee and for the negotiations to proceed in the manner that they did. This is not to say that there was definitely any exploitation, but it does call into question the manner in which southern States must “learn” how to play the game in order to participate and what this means for southern policy space. If a southern State must acquiesce to northern policies and rules to produce preferred outcomes it may be worth it for those that profit from the policy implementation. However, this may not be the preferred outcome of all involved. For those that supported ROPPA’s argument of food security in both the North and the South, the policy space of the cotton producing countries was constrained not only by the NGOs involved but by the rules of the game that automatically constrain what can be considered “acceptable” actions and “unacceptable” or “ineffective” campaigns or actions. ROPPA’s unequivocal support of all base commodity producers’ was considered an unacceptable campaign as it went against the current paradigm of strategic bargaining based on single products. The entire apparatus of the WTO is based on “logical” arguments and hard bargaining, which allows for certain compromises in negotiations. If an organisation takes too radical of a position, i.e. it refuses to negotiate on a certain issue, then it is left behind.The issue of compromise becomes even more apparent in the decision to go to the negotiating table rather than the Dispute Settlement Body as overall political realities are very important. Additionally, emotive arguments for small producers are not acceptable discourse even by those who protect their own farmers.

The inability of the cotton producing countries (and in a larger sense all poor countries) to fund a dispute is an inherent constraint on southern countries’ policy space and options. In addition, their inability to effectively implement reprisals in the event of a win against the US in court proves that this policy option was effectively eliminated due to an inherent real politik in the system. The question remains whether these inherent power disparities can be overcome or are reified by NGOs (or other international actors), but even if these power disparities are still present; NGOs are strategic actors in trade governance.

Fichas :

¹www.oxfamamerica.com

²www.enda.sn

³Ibid.

⁴Interview with Eric Hazard, director of ENDA tiers monde.

⁵www.ictsd.org

⁶Interview with IDEAS via email. (translation from French by author)

⁷www.ideascentre.ch

⁸www.roppa.info

⁹www.aproca.net

¹⁰Quoted from an interview with Mr. Bernard Kuiten, director of external relations of the WTO