Introduction

 

International trade is composed of a set of rules and regulations agreed upon by individual nation-states, or a group of nations, to create a constellation of accords that are a central component to what can be referred to as « economic governance » . The difference between “governing” and “governance” is that “governing” presupposes that there is a body or authority that constrains the behaviour of its members and has the ability to impose sanctions. Governance, on the other hand, refers more to a set of guiding principles, mechanisms and frameworks for driving policy decisions and influencing behavior. The WTO is not a governing body in this sense, as even its dispute settlement court does not have the power to “force” a country to reconcile its trade policies with a ruling. Instead, a country must agree and ratify the change in policy or face retaliation by one or more of the WTO’s 149 member states. The WTO is a unique organisation that brings countries together into a forum to discuss trade, rather than a governing body that orders the behaviour of nation-states. The interactions of member countries in their diplomatic measures towards one another, and in each agreement reached, produce a form of governance, as it creates precedent and upholds agreements that change the policies of countries < 1> . The trade regime can be thought of in this way, as Rosenau has stated, as a form of governance without government.<2> If we take Rosenau’s argument further, each overlapping bilateral agreement or “trade regime” comes together in one forum to create a governance structure for all the States involved. This governance “fills in the lacunae between regimes, and perhaps more importantly to the principles, norms, rules and procedures that come into play when two or more regimes overlap, conflict or otherwise require arrangements that facilitate accommodation among competing interests”. < 3> In this way, each country, therefore, is at once creating this governance through its own self-interest and through each agreement negotiated. The forum in which this takes place is the WTO (World Trade Organization) which facilitates the trading regimes. In a description of the elements of governance by Helene Yanacopulos, she argues that, “there is a pressing need to understand not merely the importance of these relations [between organisational actors] and what results from them, but the quality of the relations themselves…[ because these] relations are negotiated, renegotiated and fluid .” (Yanacopulos: 2005).<4> In this way it is important to understand the actors who frame and steer the issues and the quality (success) of these interactions in economic governance.

For states, their diplomatic (framing and steering) measures are enacted on two levels: domestic and international. < 5> The interactions between these two levels either enlarge or restrict the policy space of each State, and thus its ability to negotiate.<6> However, the interactions of States do not take place in a closed box. The disaster in Seattle and the failure in Cancùn point to other factors that have an effect on this governance created between States. Two questions emerge from these situations: How does the advent of new actors contribute to/influence the policy choices of negotiators (of their respective member countries) and how does this affect the outcomes of trade negotiations? In much the same way as Krasner describes international regimes as intervening variables in world politics < 7> , this model shows how non-governmental organisations are the intervening variables of change in economic governance.

Explanation of Model

Interstate governance

The model attempts to demonstrate the working relationships between States, both at the national and international level, in order to understand the correlation between their actions in both. The construction of governance in world trade is formed by the participation of States at the national level (i.e. their national policies that affect trade) and at the international level, such as in WTO negotiations. The relationship between the two levels of economic policy (or order?) is dynamic and reflexive: the States interact with each other in the framework of the WTO in order to create mutually agreed upon rules. The WTO framework thus provides a forum whereby those rules are enacted and upheld. In the model, the relationship is direct and represented by two solid arrows connecting the two actors. In addition, because the States represented in the model are a compilation of multiple entities where each State is self-interested and negotiating for its own interests, their different actions and perceptions are filtered through a sub box entitled “coalitions and competition”. They compete with each other for optimal policies that are often in conflict; however, they can form coalitions in order to achieve progress on their own agendas in a more efficient way.

In addition, the State category is divided into two parts: paradigm shifters and defenders of the status quo. This variation on the North-South divide takes into account the new and diverse interests of national actors. In an increasingly interconnected world, a country’s policy space and its interests are no longer strictly endogenously defined. As information moves faster and reaches farther, each country’s policies become increasingly more transparent and their strategic interests become more complex as they must take into account possible retribution from other actors or decide how to use those same actors to serve their own objectives. Additionally, there is a blurring between interests as growing interdependency creates common single issue area convergences among States that oppose one another on various issues.

In the specific case of the WTO, the current paradigm is that free trade is the way forward for solving poverty and creating a more developed and egalitarian world. This paradigm is upheld by those who gain from the system and also surprisingly by some who lose, which can be ascribed to alliance-building around a single issue which serves the loser’s primary interests. Paradoxically, there are some that gain from the system, yet support NGOs that seek to undermine or change the system. In addition, the tools used by the paradigm shifters as well as the status quo defenders may overlap: for example, in their equal exploitation of the funds given by international development donors.

Non-governmental actors

 

The NGO variable intervenes in the negotiation process between the national (domestic, State politics) and the international level (intergovernmental negotiations) through its interactions with the member governments. This occurs on two levels: indirect and direct influence. The techniques of these different types of influence are determined by the political orientation and methods used of a particular NGO. In this model the division is determined by the perception the NGO has of itself: a knowledge broker (“neutral” information/expertise provider) or public opinion shaper (information gathering and lobbying on a certain position) which is divided into two sub categories: those that are “speaking for self” and those that are “speaking for the other”. These divisions are made to highlight the differences in techniques and capabilities to influence the member States based on the perceptions of the States on NGO participation as well as the efficacy of these techniques on specific issues. < 8> The quality and efficacy of these techniques in collaboration creates an incentive for NGOs to form transnational networks in order to lobby these domestic governments and profit from the collective force that comes from collaboration efforts.

The NGO part of the model works in a similar way to the States’ as the alliances that are formed can determine the outcome (positive= high influence or negative= low influence). The first group of NGOs (knowledge brokers) seek to directly influence governments by participating in their delegations and indirectly influence them through their provision of expertise, dissemination of information and seminars. This group may also form coalitions with local organisations within States in order to form partnerships that empower them and bring their concerns to the international level. < 9> The second group of NGOs (public opinion shapers) seek to directly influence governments by their policies of “naming and shaming” and forcing governments to either change their policies or face reprisals from the international community. Their indirect actions consist of mobilising the population (electorate) of the targeted country in order to change the government’s policy. They form coalitions while simultaneously in competition with one another due to differences in ideology and political approach. Their group is composed of those that “speak for others” and those that “speak for themselves”, indicating a difference in supposed legitimacy in relation to their ties in the field. The convergences in differing groups create different trans-national networks, resulting in State-NGO co-operation and NGO-NGO co-operation.

Concurring with Rosenau, Scholte (et. al) proposes that the transformation of global economic governance is a result of the encounter between multilateral economic institutions and these global social movements. < 10> The impact of this influence is reflected in changes in policy, alliance shifts, changes in agenda, addition of certain words in an intergovernmental text and policy networks with States. Coleman < 11> defines two main dimensions of these policy networks: the structural patterns (how power is shared between state and non-state actors) and the degree and patterns of integration among the members. His idea of multi-level governance to include civil society actors is a key factor in understanding how these actors can intervene in economic governance. < 12> However, Coleman concludes that at the international level positions of non-state actors are excluded. He cites a recent example of the Common Policy on Agriculture in which civil society was not represented nor consulted by intergovernmental organisations.

 

This model responds to this argument concluding that certain coalitions can and do have an effect in changing the way States interact in intergovernmental negotiations due to their ability to frame the agenda as “insiders” and “outsiders” in the policy realm. Whether or not actual official “representation” occurs in the decision-making process does not impact the inner workings of indirect participation and the steering of these intergovernmental organisations, specifically in the case of the WTO.The fact that NGOs in the WTO do not have an observer status similar to that enjoyed by NGOs in the UN matters little when the majority of the work of NGOs takes place outside WTO negotiations. Influencing governments by pressuring them and their constituencies or, on a macro level, setting the agenda and framing what the States will actually negotiate on is where NGOs are most powerful.

The model can be applied to specific case studies, and attempts to answer the following questions: What are the principles and norms that govern these new variables (NGOs)? What methods succeed in achieving their outcomes? What fuels their co-operation in certain interest areas? Is this co-operation short term or long term? How are powers relations overcome ”funding” and “funded” actors?

As further inquiry into the last question, a box of “external variables” was added into the model in order to recognize the meta-structures and external forces that can condition certain actors’ behaviours and can have a large effect, not only on negotiating power and policy space but on the rules of engagement between actors. First, the structural power of those that are “funding” States is seen in their indirect ability to set the rules of the entire “game” of international trade negotiations. For example: the fact that the WTO was founded on trade liberalisation is a concept that large “funding” countries have determined is the best policy option for those “funded”. The US’ and EUs’ negligence to address agricultural subsidies in liberalisation talks before the Doha round is another example of their ability to choose what goes on the table and what stays out. The effects of this power are reflected in: the decision making process of deciding which countries are allowed to negotiate in the “Green Room”, the norms of “accepted discourse” at WTO negotiations, the specific legal standard (anglo-saxon common law), the preference for technical arguments and, most importantly, the overall policy agenda (this extends to both the paradigm shifters and the status quo defenders). The effects of the relative power of “funding” non-governmental actors can be seen in their partnerships which do not always require consent or that their objective be achieved in a democratic way. Such power can also be demonstrated by these actors “speaking for a community” which may exclude important social groups . < 13>The third variable represents international lobbies and multinational companies who defend their interests at WTO conferences and try to influence not only member governments but also NGOs. The international lobbies are powerful groups, yet they mainly express themselves through direct influence of member State governments. On the international stage their physical presence carries important symbolic power and reminds States of the constituency they defend, as well as their ability to have their voices heard in daily briefings with their State’s ministers.

 

The impact of development donors such as USAID, AFD and others on policy outcomes occurs in a more direct way. They work on two levels: in the field with individual States and through NGOs. While the financing agencies are funded by their respective countries, they may find that certain politically sensitive issues are best handled through the influence of a third party (NGOs). Their impact is thus on both levels: they finance technical projects in States but also work through NGOs to influence policy outcomes in States. While the model only examines the trade/political aspects of economic governance, there are certain influences that impact the actors’ decisions that go beyond the present analysis.

Thus, while recognizing there are numerous meta-variables in all political settings, and taking note of different actors influence not recorded here such as international lobbies and development donor impacts on States, this model demonstrates the complexities and seemingly inexplicable tendencies in NGO alliances and techniques used to influence the WTO negotiating process. (For an application of this model on the specific case of cotton, please see the paper titled “NGOs as intervening variables in WTO Trade Governance: A case study on the Cotton Initiative”)

Notes :

¹See Rosenau’s definition of governance: “activities backed by shared goals that may or may not derive from legal and formally prescribed responsibilities that do not necessarily rely on public powers to overcome defiance and attain compliance.” Here, the shared goal is a trading system. Governance without Government : Order and change in World Politics. Eds: Rosenau James and Czempiel, Ernst-Otto.1992. p. 4.

²Rosenau ibid. p.5.

³Ibid. P.9.

⁴Yanacopulos, Helena, “Patterns of Governance: the rise of trans-national coalitions of NGOs”, Global Society 19(3) 2005.

⁵See comment in reaction to a Democratic Deficit in the WTO by Patrick Messerlin, “Three variations on ‘The Future of the WTO’, Journal of Economic Law 8(2). 2005. He describes the methods in which domestic sovereignty stays intact exactly because of the domestic negotiations that must take place. Thus the interactions with States and the WTO forum actually increase augment their domestic sovereignty.

⁶ See « Policy Space Development of the South » , South Centre, No. 1, November 2005.

⁷ Krasner, Stephen, International Regimes, Cornell University Press, 1991. Regimes are defined as intervening variables between basic causal factors and outcomes and behaviour.

⁸ Coleman, William D. “Policy Networks, Non-state Actors and Internationalized Policy-Making: a Case Study of Agricultural Trade. » in Daphné Josselin and William Wallace, eds Non-State Actors in World Politics. Hound Mills, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001

⁹ However, see Johnson H. and Wilson G., « Biting the bullet: Civil Society, Social learning and the Transformation of Local Governance. » World Development. 28(11) 2000 for an analysis of these coalitions which are not necessarily based on equality between the respective partners. Jonhson H. and Mayoux break down these “partnerships” into a 3 level matrix of “power to” power over” and “power with” (in “ Learning and not learning from experience in rural project planning.” Public Administratin and Development. 9,p 1-16,1998) and challenge the normative claim of “participation” leading to the empowerment of disadvantaged groups (“invisible individuals, groups, or organizations”), p 149. They conclude that power relations between stakeholders don’t disappear and complex social dynamics are not necessarily resolved between partners. Although the article is on a micro level it can be extrapolated to the macro level especially in NGOs who claim to “speak for the other.”

¹⁰ Scholte, Goetz, O’Brien, Contesting Global Governance. Cambridge press, 2000.

¹¹Coleman, William D. “Policy Networks, Non-State Actors and Internationalized Policy Making.” in Daphné Josselin and William Wallace, eds Non-State Actors in World Politics. Hound Mills, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001

¹²ibid.

¹³See previous conversation by Johnson H. And Wilson G., “Learning and not learning from experience in rural project planning.” Public Administration and Development. 9,p 1-16,1998).